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Abstract 
 
The advent of Internet of Things (IoT) technology 
exponentially increases the collection of new 
information types in consumers’ lives from various 
sensors. However, many consumers do not fully 
recognize the potential privacy and security risks 
(PSR) associated with IoT. Those who are aware 
rarely take action to protect their personal 
information because of a cognitive gap between PSR 
and its impact. To address this problem, we propose 
a design framework for evaluating and quantifying 
IoT PSRs related to IoT adoption. Grounded in the 
cognitive dissonance theory (CDT) and information 
processing theory (IPT), the proposed framework 
defines IoT PSR scores and proposes a visual 
representation for improving consumers’ awareness 
of PSRs. Furthermore, we suggest a PSR control 
balance theory (PSR-CBT) to explicate the 
consumers’ two internal power conflicts. The 
proposed PSR scores can reduce consumers’ 
cognitive gaps, and thus, help them make informed 
purchase decisions toward IoT devices and services.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The rapid evolution of the Internet and the explosion 
of Internet of Things (IoT) technology has made life 
very convenient for people, but at the same time, 
such technological advances posed new challenges to 
privacy and security protection. Beyond expanding 
traditional person-to-person communication, IoT 
extensively uses a vast array of sensors that are the 
objects of communication for person-to-things and 
things-to-things communications, as well as existing 
cellular communication and wireless technologies, 
such as Bluetooth (BT), Wi-Fi, and Zigbee [1]. Many 
consumers are attracted to its new features and 
convenience, either knowingly or unwittingly 
disclosing their personal information. Sometimes, 
they are not even aware of personal information 
leaks. CNN reported IoT privacy and security issues 
in 2019: “Not only is Alexa listening when you speak 
to an Echo smart speaker, an Amazon employee is 
potentially listening, too” [2]. 
 As a result of IoT privacy and security problems, 
there is a great demand for mechanisms to protect 
IoT privacy and security. For the IoT security 
markets, Gartner predicts that, “worldwide IoT 
security spend will increase from $912M in 2016, 
soaring to $3.1B in 2021, attaining a 27.87% CAGR 
in the forecast period” [3]. 
IoT technology not only collects a massive 
amount of consumers’ information, but it is also 
capable of understanding and predicting their 
behaviors. IoT devices are inherently small and cheap 
with limited privacy and security protection functions 
because strong protection systems in hardware and 
software cannot be embedded in a small and cheap 
device [4]. Thus, the privacy and security risks (PSR) 
of using IoT technology are much more significant 
than those of conventional electronic home devices. 
Consequently, IoT experts have warned consumers 
about the privacy and security vulnerabilities of IoT. 
Despite the vulnerability of IoT devices and services, 
it seems that in some cases, IoT PSRs do not appear 
to have an influence on the consumers’ intention to 
purchase and use IoT. This is due to consumers’ 
cognitive gaps and lack of awareness of privacy risks 
and security vulnerabilities related to IoT [5]. 
To reduce consumers’ cognitive gaps and 
improve the awareness of PSRs, we propose a new 
mechanism for assessing IoT PSRs, namely personal 
PSR scores. We determine the PSR scores by 
collectively considering consumers’ IoT information 
types, weight impact factors, and personal 
capabilities. Furthermore, we will propose a new 
design theory for personal PSR assessment that can 
be used to explain how consumers internally make a 
disclosure decision [6]. Because a design science 
research (DSR) concentrates on developing solutions 
to problems [7], a DSR approach is suitable for the 
development of our proposed PSR scores and theory. 
We adopt the information systems design theory 
(ISDT) because ISDT allows us to apply a set of 
requirements and designs for a solution. In addition, 
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we adopt the publication schema for DSR [8, 9, 10], 
which guides us to communicate with prior literature.  
 
2. Literature Review  
 
In this section, we review previous literature to 
demonstrate consumers’ paradoxical behaviors 
between their attitudes toward PSRs and their actual 
IoT purchase and use behaviors. The objective is to 
analyze existing PSRs in the literature and identify 
new types of IoT PSRs that pose a threat to 
consumers. We then propose a new artifact as a 
solution to minimize the cognitive gap and increase 
consumers’ awareness of PSRs. 
The consumers’ paradoxical behaviors in PSRs 
occur when the potential risks related to IoT often 
have little influence on consumers’ purchase and use 
behaviors, until consumers experience serious and 
adverse consequences (e.g., identify theft). 
Consumers are limited as to how they manage their 
IoT PSRs, although they might think that they can 
control the risks [11]. According to a poll conducted 
in 2018, even though more than 70 percent of 
consumers believe that privacy for their data is 
extremely important and would not purchase 
products and services from an invasive company, few 
consumers take actual behaviors to protect their 
personal information [5]. This survey shows a 
cognitive gap between consumers’ attitudes and 
actual behaviors toward PSRs. Many scholars have 
researched the cognitive gap as a privacy paradox 
and agreed that the awareness of PSRs is negatively 
associated with paradoxical behaviors toward PSRs. 
Barth and Jong [12] suggest that “creating privacy 
awareness in combination with tools that support 
users in their privacy decisions should help users to 
avoid paradoxical behavior.” Kennedy-Lightsey and 
Martin [13] claim “perceived risk is key to 
individuals’ disclosure decisions.” Therefore, our 
study focuses on improving consumers’ awareness of 
IoT PSRs, and ultimately minimizing consumers’ 
cognitive gaps between their attitudes toward IoT 
PSRs and their purchase and use behaviors. 
In order to assess privacy risks, prior literature 
classified consumer-disclosed information into six 
information types: (1) demographic information, (2) 
contact information, (3) vehicle information, (4) 
lifestyle, interests, and activities data, (5) financial 
and economic data, such as estimated income and 
home value, and (6) financial and credit data, such as 
credit score, loan, and credit card data [14]. However, 
the categorization fails to capture new types of data 
collected and transmitted by IoT devices, such as 
consumers’ behavioral tendencies, real-time 
locations, and schedules. 
Existing tools for raising privacy and security 
awareness are also insufficient for IoT devices. 
Belanger et al. [15] designed online parental consent 
for kid’s electronic transactions (POCKET), which is 
a practical software solution to protect children from 
online privacy risks and threats. POCKET allows 
parents to choose a specific user privacy preferences 
file (UPPF) that includes the child’s name and 27 
specific preferences, including the child’s first name, 
last name, email, address, zip code, parents’ credit 
card numbers, and so forth [15]. Although UPPF 
contains detailed information about the child, it only 
focuses on basic demographic information.  
Ananthula, et al. [16] suggested a method to 
measure privacy risks in an online social network. It 
calculates privacy quotient based on the sensitivity 
and visibility of the information shared by a user. 
Besides, they propose a privacy index (PIDX) used to 
measure the level of exposure of privacy. Some 
scholars have studied the degree to which users 
disclose their privacy as a score in multiple online 
social network environments, called the privacy 
disclosure score (PDS). With calculated PDS, they 
can analyze the user’s potential information loss. 
Morando, et al. [17] have integrated a variety of 
privacy evaluation studies with empirical research 
results on personal data evaluation. 
Although there are privacy risk evaluation 
studies, most previous privacy scoring models focus 
on the context of social media, rather than the context 
of IoT technology. Prior literature regarding privacy 
scoring models has not considered the vulnerabilities 
of IoT and the new information types that users 
normally do not encounter in social media. IoT 
broadly collects consumers’ activity data, such as 
purchasing habits, emotions, real-time location data, 
and schedules, all of which put the users at PSRs 
from inappropriate manipulation and secondary use 
by vendors [18, 19, 20]. 
 
3. A Design Science Approach 
 
This study adopts ISDT and the publication schema 
for a DSR study suggested by Gregor and Hevner 
[10]. The general overview of ISDT, including the 
kernel theories, meta-requirements (MR), meta-
designs (MD), and testable hypotheses (TH), 
corresponds to the method section of the publication 
schema [10]. The MD in ISDT corresponds to the 
artifact description section of the publication schema. 
The evaluation section of the publication schema is 
used to test the research hypotheses of ISDT. 
We choose the cognitive dissonance theory 
(CDT) as our major kernel theory. CDT considers a 
privacy paradox as a cognitive gap between attitudes 
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and actual behaviors. IS scholars have already 
learned that the increase of PSR awareness reduces 
consumers’ paradoxical behaviors [5, 12, 13]. To 
improve PSR awareness, we adopt the information 
processing theory (IPT) that can explicate the 
relationship between information types and 
individuals’ processing abilities toward the 
information. Furthermore, we propose the privacy 
and security risk control balance theory (PSR-CBT) 
based on the control balance theory (CBT) that can 
be used to explain consumers’ internal power 
conflicts when disclosing their personal information. 
Table 1 shows the components of the designed 
PSR assessment framework following ISDT. MRs 
are a set of goals for an artifact design [8]. This study 
proposes three MRs. First, we aim to develop a 
taxonomy of personal information types related to 
IoT PSRs using an inductive approach. Second, we 
design personal PSR scores, representing the level of 
perceived IoT PSRs, based on the two kernel 
theories, CDT and IPT. Last, we propose a new 
design theory based on CBT. 
MDs are a set of design elements aiming to meet 
the MRs [8]. This study’s MDs consist of five design 
elements: (1) a general process design for PSR 
assessments, (2) the process design of personal PSR 
scores, (3) the design of ten dimensions (personal 
information types, weight impact factors, and 
personal capabilities) for PSR scores, (4) a new 
model of PSR scores, and (5) a new design theory for 
PSR disclosures. 
The last component of ISDT includes testable 
hypotheses related to the designed artifact [8]. To 
evaluate the performance of the proposed artifact, 
PSR scores, our study provides three evaluation 
approaches, including evaluation with visualizations, 
consumers’ surveys, and experimental designs for 
PSR scores. 
Table 1. Components of the designed PSR 
assessment framework 
  
 
4. An IoT PSR Assessment Framework 
 
In this DSR study, we adopt CDT and IPT as our 
kernel theories to support the proposed assessment 
framework for IoT PSRs. Before discussing the 
theories, we first present general challenges in 
privacy decision making and set up the boundary 
conditions for this study. 
 
4.1. Boundary Conditions of PSR Assessment 
 
Acquisti and Grossklags [21] suggested three 
challenges in privacy-related decision making. 
Consumers have (1) incomplete information to make 
PSR disclosures, (2) lack of ability to process their 
information, and (3) various cognitive biases. We 
will focus on the problem of having incomplete 
information and infeasible processes. In particular, 
for new IoT technology, few consumers understand 
the vulnerability of IoT and the possibility of data 
manipulation by vendors. If consumers had more 
knowledge of IoT privacy and security issues, they 
would probably be more conservative in purchasing 
and using IoT devices. The proposed PSR assessment 
framework will contribute to increasing consumers’ 
awareness about the IoT devices they use, how 
significant the risks are, and how far they can control 
their information. Even if consumers had complete 
information, they would not be able to perfectly 
process their detailed information because this 
information is usually very complex [21]. The 
proposed PSR assessment framework will also 
contribute to improving consumers’ ability to 
understand the details of IoT privacy and security 
issues by visualizing consumers’ use of different data 
types and their privacy control capabilities [22]. Last, 
cognitive biases significantly influence consumers’ 
decision making with PSRs, but we consider this 
factor to be beyond the scope of the current study and 
leave it for future research. 
 
4.2. Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) 
 
We leverage CDT [23] to explicate the 
discrepancy between consumers’ attitudes toward 
PSRs and the actual purchase and use behaviors of IoT 
products and services. 
When people exhibit a conflict between their 
attitudes and their behaviors, this result is cognitive 
dissonance. This cognitive dissonance leads to a 
feeling of mental discomfort. One of the most 
popular demonstrations of CDT is the “smoking 
test”: A person acquires knowledge about smoking 
from the media, friends, acquaintances, and 
physicians. The knowledge that smoking is bad is 
dissonant with the cognition that he or she keeps 
smoking [23]. 
The principle of CDT explains that people 
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want to avoid disharmony by changing their 
attitudes or behaviors with an inner drive. CDT 
suggests three ways to reduce dissonance. First, 
people can adjust their attitudes, beliefs, or 
behaviors to reduce their mental discomfort by 
removing the conflict. In the case of IoT, if 
consumers know that there is a serious PSR, they are 
more likely to change attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors 
around purchasing a product with high risks. However, 
many individuals have difficulty changing their 
behavioral responses, despite their well-learned 
knowledge [23]. 
Second, people want to eliminate the 
disharmony between attitudes and behaviors by 
acquiring new knowledge that outweighs the 
disharmonious beliefs [23]. With IoT, consumers 
are likely to expect that IoT companies should 
provide privacy and security protection by 
implementing such features into their products and 
services. They are also likely to expect that IoT 
providers carefully protect the privacy and security 
of consumers’ data collected through IoT. However, 
in practice, there are many data breaches, and some 
companies, such as Amazon and Google, use 
consumers’ personal information to manipulate 
their consumers and increase revenue [2, 18]. 
Third, people can diminish the importance of 
cognition, such as attitudes and beliefs for their 
cognitive consonance. People try to reduce 
cognitive dissonance by making an excuse for their 
behaviors, as mentioned in the example of smokers, 
who despite knowing the fact that smoking is bad for 
health [23]. For IoT products, consumers might 
convince themselves that, even if their personal 
information is leaked, it will not be that harmful 
because “they have nothing to hide.” This, however, 
may lead to potentially serious consequences for 
everyday consumers, such as identity theft, harm to 
credit scores, and the leak of embarrassing photos 
or health conditions. The proposed PSR assessment 
framework can help consumers switch from a 
cognitive dissonance condition to a cognitive 
consonance condition by visualizing the information 
types shared with IoT, and how well they are able 
to protect their personal information. The 
improvement process of consumers’ awareness of 
PSRs can be explained by IPT. 
 
4.3. Information Processing Theory (IPT) 
 
IPT originates from the cognitive process theory, 
which deals with humans’ cognitive memories that 
consist of sensory memory, short-term memory, and 
long-term memory [24]. The information in sensory 
memory is usually unconscious and only lasts for up 
to three seconds. Short-term memory is also known 
as working memory. The information in sensory 
memory transfers to short-term memory and lasts for 
15-20 seconds in short-term memory before 
transferring to long-term memory. The amount of an 
individual’s cognitive load, the number of repeats, 
and individuals’ selective processing capability 
collectively influence how information is processed 
in the short-term memory. Although long-term 
memory has much space, it relies on the quality of 
the organization of the memory, and thus, people 
cannot usually remember all the information in their 
long-term memory [25]. 
The proposed PSR scores can improve 
consumers’ ability to process their information in 
working memory and long-term memory by 
increasing their awareness, as well as their personal 
capabilities to protect their personal information and 
organizing their distributed information regarding 
PSRs. Such improvement will occur because the PSR 
scores will help consumers visualize their use of data 
types, prior breach experiences, cultural impact, and 
the level of privacy literacy with a spider map and 
scores. Furthermore, the PSR scores will provide a 
three-level classification of PSRs and display where 
the consumers best fit [24]. 
 
4.4. MD1: The Process of PSR Assessments 
 
The first MD is a general PSR assessment 
process. Before designing the PSR scores in detail, 
we need to have a general framework for evaluating 
personal PSRs with IoT. First, we start with an 
information collection process to establish the types 
of PSRs. Because the concept of IoT may be too 
broad, we focus on IoT technology which collects 
data from various wireless sensors such as Amazon 
EchoTM and Google HomeTM. Second, we identify 
possible privacy risks and security vulnerabilities 
based on the collected information. Third, we assess 
the identified PSRs. However, existing risk 
assessment developed for social networks might not 
be applicable to IoT. To determine the level of PSRs, 
we should find out the likelihood and impact of the 
identified PSRs [26]. Thus, we determine the 
likelihood and impact of potential risks. Based on the 
likelihood and impact, we categorize information 
types for PSRs. Last, we provide a personal privacy 
and security evaluation result, which is then used to 
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develop personal PSR scores. 
This study follows MD1, which includes data 
collection, identification of PSRs and vulnerabilities, 
assessment of PSRs with the likelihood and impact 
(see Table 2). For steps 4, 5, and 6 of MD1, we 
suggest a matrix of personal PSR levels. The risk 
levels are strongly associated with the risk likelihood 
and impact [27]. When both factors are high, PSR is 
the highest. Figure 1 presents the matrix of different 
PSR levels, which influence the design of 
information types and weight impacts for MD2-MD4. 
To apply the last step of MD1 to PSR scores, we 
propose the process of PSR scores as MD2. 
 
(L: Low; M: Medium; H: High) 
Figure 1. The matrix of PSR levels 
Table 2. The general process of PSR 
assessments 
 
 
4.5. MD2: The Process of PSR Scores 
 
In this meta-design, we propose a process of 
generating personal PSR scores. First, we identify 
PSRs in IoT technology based on existing literature 
and experts’ opinions. Given a new IoT technology, 
experts’ opinions are particularly important because 
it is not easy to understand and assess the new 
technology for novices. Furthermore, we use survey 
data developed by professional survey firms [28, 29]. 
Second, we generate a taxonomy of IoT PSRs by 
classifying personal information types. In particular, 
IoT devices yield various information types that 
could be breached and used as a tool to manipulate 
consumers by the vendors [18]. Last, we quantify 
PSRs as scores and then display the scores in a 
visualization form [26]. 
Based on the overall PSR score design process 
presented in Figure 2, we will propose MD3 and 
MD4. 
 
Figure 2. The process of PSR scores 
 
4.6. MD3: The Design of New Dimensions 
 
In this MD, we develop four new dimensions for 
IoT information types based on an inductive 
approach. As secondary data, we initially use the 
surveys conducted in 2018 and 2019 by RSA which 
is a professional survey company [28, 29]. The 
results of these surveys indicate that financial and 
banking information is the most significant threat for 
IoT consumers, followed by security information 
identity information, and personal activity 
information. In particular, consumers’ activity 
information, such as purchasing history and location 
information, is introduced in new IoT technology 
environments since vendors can manipulate 
consumers’ purchasing behaviors or personalized 
advertisements via consumers’ activity data [18, 30, 
31]. The consumer survey result is summarized in 
Figure 3. Interestingly, there are big cultural 
differences in personal information types [28, 29]. For 
example, US consumers are more sensitive to sharing 
location data than German and French consumers. US 
and French consumers are more generous than 
German consumers in disclosing their information. 
Early adopters want to purchase IoT devices and 
services to improve their ability to achieve their goals, 
for example the monitoring of diet using wearable IoT 
devices [28, 29]. 
 
Figure 3. Consumers’ care about 
information types 
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Figure 4 shows the results of MD3. We start with 
specific IoT information types such as credit card 
numbers, passwords, social security number (SSN), 
personal activities, and location data. Based on the 
different types of IoT data, we synthesize and create 
ten themes, such as financial, security, ID, family, 
contact, activity, location, and time information. 
These ten themes potentially reveal four new IoT 
PSR dimensions: monetary, security, identification, 
and manipulation risks. In practice, although we can 
directly use the ten themes to analyze a consumer’s 
personal PSR score, we abstract these ten themes to 
four dimensions that can lead to a new theory in the 
privacy and security area. 
 
Figure 4. The IoT information type coding 
Dixon and Gellman [14] classified consumers’ 
information types for purchasing as demographic, 
contact, vehicles, lifestyle/interests/activities, 
financial and economic, and financial and credit data. 
However, the classification method does not directly 
apply to IoT because IoT collects more data types. 
Compared to Dixon and Gellman’s classification, the 
proposed IoT information types adds security, ID, 
family, location, and time information. Figure 5 
shows the proposed ten IoT information types. 
 
Figure 5. The proposed IoT information types 
 
4.7. MD4: The Model of PSR Scores 
 
This MD defines the calculation of personal PSR 
scores that collectively consider four information 
types, three weight impact factors, and three personal 
capabilities. The proposed PSR scores show the level 
of balance between two powers: personal information 
disclosure power and personal information control 
power. The personal information disclosure power is 
calculated as the product of the four information 
types and the corresponding weight impact factors. 
The personal information control power is measured 
based on three personal capabilities. The weight 
impact factors positively moderate the relationship 
between the information risk type and the PSR 
scores. Volume, culture, and personal breach 
experiences are the elements of the weight impact 
factors. Volume is an important element used to 
determine the weight of the impact of information 
types on PSR since the impact of risks will fluctuate 
according to the number of IoT devices, the number 
of friends on social media accounts, the usage of 
Cloud services, and the scale of disclosure [32]. 
Cultural differences also influence the PSRs 
since culture determines the social norms and values. 
Soares and Shoham [33] cite the definition of culture 
from Sekaran in 1983 as “culturally patterned 
behaviors are thus distinct from the economic, 
political, legal, religious, linguistic, educational, 
technological and industrial environment in which 
people find themselves.” Hofstede [34] defines 
culture as “the collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the members of one human 
group from another.” Hofstede’s four cultural 
dimensions, such as masculinity and femininity, 
uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and 
individualism and collectivism, are the outcomes 
from more than 100,000 IBM employees in 40 
different countries [33, 34]. 
Prior studies found that previous experiences 
play a significant role as a moderator between 
optimistic biases and risk estimates at both a personal 
level and a social level [35]. According to IBM 
research, 28% of consumers have a data breach 
experience [36]. “Users who have never experienced 
a privacy breach are more trusting and link easily 
with reciprocating users. However, after experiencing 
a privacy breach, users become aware of the privacy 
risks on SNS and use the permeability rules to more 
cautiously share information” [37]. 
Personal capabilities negatively moderate the 
impact of information types on the PSR scores. To 
demonstrate the knowledge dimension in this study, 
we define knowledge as a technical understanding of 
the IoT and general computer-related techniques. 
Based on Byrd and Turner [38], we chose to use the 
term technical knowledge, which represents 
programming languages, IoT devices and services, 
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computer operating systems, expert systems or 
artificial intelligence (AI), network management and 
maintenance, developing Web or App-based 
applications, and big data warehousing or data 
mining skills. 
Compared to the general knowledge of IoT 
technology, privacy literacy focuses on privacy and 
security. Prior scholars have suggested the concept of 
privacy literacy and defined it in various ways [39]. 
Nevertheless, leading scholars have emphasized the 
application of skills online as well as the knowledge 
of privacy: “Online privacy literacy may be defined 
as a combination of factual or declarative (“knowing 
that”) and procedural (“knowing how”) knowledge 
about online privacy” [40]. Thus, we define privacy 
literacy as the ability to collect personal information 
and apply practical skills online for personal data 
protection and privacy regulation. 
Self-efficacy is also one of the essential 
constructs in privacy and security theories. Bandura 
[41] introduced self-efficacy before developing the 
social cognitive theory (SCT). According to the 
advent and development of computer network 
markets, computer self-efficacy (CSE) was suggested 
as a targeted form of self-efficacy. Mobile computing 
self-efficacy (MCSE) is a specific form of CSE for 
mobile environments. With the dramatic increase in 
the use of mobile computing devices, IS researchers 
have differentiated the self-efficacy of a mobile 
device from traditional self-efficacy and CSE, in 
order to analyze their models more accurately [42]. In 
this study, we follow the definition of self-efficacy, 
suggested by Johnston and Warkentin [43]: “the 
degree to which an individual believes in his or her 
ability to enact the recommended response.” 
We now describe how to calculate PSR scores 
mathematically, with four IoT information risk types, 
three weight impact factors, and three personal 
capabilities. The amount of each information risk 
type shared with an IoT device is multiplied by the 
level of significance, which is estimated using 
consumer survey results. Based on the survey results 
in Figure 3, monetary risk information disclosure will 
be the baseline risk because consumers worry the 
most about money-related information disclosure [28, 
29]. We set its level of significance to be a. Security 
risk information disclosure is less concerned than 
money-related information. Its level of significance is 
β (β < a). Similarly, the level of significance for 
identification risk information disclosure is set to δ (δ 
< β) while that of manipulation risk information 
disclosure is set to γ (γ < δ). The weights of the 
information types can be adjusted over time, based on 
the latest consumer surveys. For the calculation of the 
consumers’ disclosing power, we multiply 
information types and weight impact factors because 
there is an individual difference, based on the 
consumer’s network volume, culture, and previous 
experience. To calculate personal capabilities, we 
measure consumers’ knowledge about IoT or new 
technology, self-efficacy, and privacy literacy via 
survey methods. Finally, we normalize the overall 
scores. Figure 6 shows the overall model expressed 
as a mathematical equation. Figure 7 shows the 
overall framework of the PSR scores. Figure 8 
demonstrates the role of a moderator that moderates 
the impact of consumers’ attitudes on their intention 
to behave.  
 
Figure 6. Mathematical equations of PSR scores 
 
Figure 7. The conceptual framework of PSR 
scores 
 
Figure 8. The model of PSR scores 
  
4.8. MD5: A New Design Theory 
 
As a final MD, we propose a new theory, PSR-
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CBT, grounded in CBT and IPT [24]. The proposed 
PSR scores can contribute to not only supporting 
consumers to move their information from the short-
term memory to the long-term memory by 
quantifying and visualizing the PSRs, but also by 
improving the identification of consumers’ 
tendencies and abilities. 
CBT discusses two powers [6]. When one power 
is stronger than the other, the stronger power can 
attack or hurt the weaker one. This study uses the two 
internal “powers” of personal information disclosure 
and personal information control. The disclosure 
power can be evaluated by information types and 
weight impact factors. The control power can be 
evaluated by personal capabilities. First, if the 
disclosure power is stronger than the control power, 
consumers are likely to disclose their personal 
information with little hesitation. Although 
consumers actively communicate with various 
sensors and online friends via IoT, they would be 
exposed to high risks. Second, if the disclosure power 
and the control power move to equilibrium, 
consumers will fall into a significant cognitive gap or 
a privacy paradox and hesitate to disclose their 
information. However, PSR scores can help increase 
the awareness of their disclosure habits and personal 
capabilities and reduce the cognitive gap. Third, if 
the control power is stronger than the disclosure 
power, consumers are not likely to disclose their 
information. 
In this case, consumers will face limitations in 
various communications or online social 
relationships, and could isolate themselves, although 
their risks will be minimized. Using the equation in 
Figure 9, we can conclude which power is stronger. If 
the result is greater than 1, the disclosure power is 
higher than the control power, and if it is less than 1, 
the disclosure power is higher than the control power. 
Using the PSR scores, consumers will be aware of 
their current vulnerabilities, manage their personal 
PSRs, and minimize their privacy cognitive gaps. 
 
Figure 9. The discriminant of PSR scores 
 
4.9. Visualization 
Figure 10 is a simulated outcome with four new 
personal information types, three weight impact 
factors for the information types, and three personal 
capabilities to control PSRs. This spider map shows 
all the scores of the ten dimensions; consumers can 
easily recognize their weak parts and strong parts. 
This visualization will also display the result of the 
PSR control balance: a warning phrase and graphical 
signals. 
 
5. DSR Evaluation 
 
As an evaluation of our DSR approach, testable 
hypotheses of ISDT are used to evaluate whether 
MDs satisfy MRs [9]. In this study, we use an 
experimental design to test three hypotheses for the 
evaluation of our MDs. 
Figure 10. The spider map of the outcomes 
We will measure the way in which the change of 
consumers’ awareness toward PSRs is improved 
before and after having personal PSR scores. To 
measure if consumers’ cognitive gaps are reduced, 
we will provide three statements. (1) I feel my 
awareness of PSRs improved after having my PSR 
scores. (2) I intend to be more careful when using the 
IoT after having my PSR scores. (3) I am willing to 
change my behavior towards the use of IoT devices 
after having my PSR scores. 
The PSR scores are calculated by a consumer 
survey. Table 3 shows the scales of the ten 
dimensions for the consumer survey. All 
questionnaires and demographic questions are 
available upon request. 
Table 3. The scales of the ten dimensions 
 
Our testable hypotheses include the following: 
TH1: The consumers who see the visualized PSR 
scores have better awareness of PSRs than those who 
do not. 
TH2: The PSR scores have a negative influence on 
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consumers’ cognitive gaps. 
TH3: The PSR scores have a positive influence on 
consumers’ behavioral changes. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
This study potentially contributes to minimizing 
consumers’ cognitive gaps and improving 
consumers’ awareness of PSRs by providing personal 
PSR scores and visualizing the PSR scores with a 
spider map and warning messages. We suggest new 
classifications and dimensions toward IoT 
information types, such as security, identification, 
family, location, and time information. These 
information types are likely manipulated by vendors 
as well as hackers in IoT settings, since IoT devices 
and services are naturally vulnerable toward PSRs. 
Last, this research proposes a new design theory for 
PSR disclosures called PSR-CBT that explicates 
consumers’ internal assessments toward PSRs in IoT 
settings by evaluating disclosing power and control 
power. Furthermore, PSR-CBT can be generalized 
for other consumers’ decision making when they 
have two internal conflicting powers. For example, 
when a person posts a sensitive picture on Facebook, 
there may be a conflict between disclosure power and 
control power in his or her mind. 
However, this study has several limitations. 
First, although the PSR scores help consumers to 
increase their awareness of PSRs, the direct influence 
of the cognitive gap between the attitude and actual 
behavior is not easily measured since we should 
measure the change of the consumers’ purchasing 
behaviors. Second, PSR scores can be subjective until 
we have sufficient PSR score data to compare 
individuals to populations. Third, the weight for 
information types and cultural differences can be 
changed, since the individuals’ personalities and 
experiences can be altered. 
As the next steps, first, we can validate and 
apply the proposed PSR-CBT to other fields to 
generalize the theory. Although PSR-CBT is applied 
to IoT settings in this study, PSR-CBT can be applied 
to other privacy and security issues when consumers 
make a decision. For example, when a person posts a 
sensitive picture on Facebook, there may be a conflict 
between disclosure power and control power in his or 
her mind. Second, we can identify the distinction 
between privacy and security in a future study 
because privacy and security may have different 
influence mechanisms on consumers’ decisions. 
Third, future studies can carry out to identify 
consumers’ trust issues toward IoT companies. 
Fourth, although we presented three reasons for 
privacy and security decision making, we did not 
consider cognitive biases in this study. We thus 
suggest further research on the relationship between 
cognitive biases and the privacy calculus model [31]. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The advent of IoT leads to a change in the use of 
information types. Consumers face more serious 
PSRs because of the new information types that can 
be easily breached and manipulated by vendors. 
However, many consumers have limited information 
about IoT. Even consumers who have enough 
information about IoT rarely take action to protect 
personal information because of the cognitive gap. 
This DSR study of personal PSR scores in the 
IoT settings contributes to minimizing the cognitive 
gap that explicates consumers’ paradoxical behaviors 
and increasing the awareness of PSRs. We followed 
two DSR methodologies, including ISDT and 
publication schema for DSR to create the proposed 
artifact of PSR scores based on CDT and IPT. 
The PSR scores consist of three major parts and 
ten dimensions in detail. IoT information risk types 
have four dimensions; monetary, security, 
identification, and manipulation risks. Weight impact 
factors, composed of volume, cultures, and prior 
experiences, play a role as a positive moderator 
between IoT information risk types and personal PSR 
scores. Personal capabilities, such as technical 
knowledge, privacy literacy, and self-efficacy for IoT 
PSRs, negatively moderate between IoT information 
risk types and personal PSR scores. 
The proposed PSR-CBT contributes to 
consumers’ understanding of their behaviors toward 
PSR disclosures by addressing the individuals’ two 
internal powers. Future studies can develop the 
concept of PSR-CBT and the PSR scores as a general 
index that can be practically applied to consumers all 
around the world. 
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